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Fraud and Internal Control
by W I L L I A M J. PLANTHABER

Partner, Houston Office
Presented before the Texas Chapter of the National Office
Management Association, Beaumont, Texas—October 1961
KNOWLEDGE

of fraud and of factors important to its prevention is
mandatory if men, such as you, who are a part of management
are to carry out their functions capably.
Fraud and embezzlements are nothing new on the American business scene. A n introduction to a text on the subject, published over
thirty years ago, stressed the alarming prevalence of fraud as one
of the great problems confronting business. Today the emphasis is
on its alarming growth.
The American Bankers Association reports bank embezzlements
of more than $10,000 each for the calendar years 1958, 1959, and 1960 to
be $6,400,000, $8,800,000, and $10,100,000, respectively. During the
first half of 1961, a record annual rate of $17,000,000 was being established. A decade ago, in 1951, the figure was $5,600,000. While these
figures represent a substantial 300 per cent increase in one decade,
they are, in the words of one banker, microscopic when compared
with industrial pilferage and business embezzlements.
New business development in the consumer financing field has,
in recent years, added to banks' vulnerability. This is a highly specialized field of activity and requires especially good controls over
loan approvals and pay-outs, and credit and collection procedures.
It is always a suspicious circumstance to auditors when only one
person in a finance company or consumers' credit department of a
bank has handled all activities relating to a borrower's account. A s
a group, however, banks have done much to control embezzlements.
This includes not only the work of bank-audit committees and more
activity in independent verification of customers accounts, but additional assurance by engaging the services of certified public accountants as well.
There are no accurate statistics on the annual embezzlement loss
to business. Some authorities say a million businessmen are victimized
by embezzlers every year, and that annual embezzlement losses range
from one to three billion dollars. If the annual losses are only onehalf the maximum estimate, the daily losses are $5 million per work215

ing day. That business embezzlements are keeping pace with the rise
being experienced by banks is demonstrated by an increase of 250 per
cent in fidelity insurance losses from 1946 to 1956.
In commenting on bank-embezzlement losses in September of
this year, M r . George H . Hottendorf, deputy manager of the American Bankers Association, stated, "When considering the upward turn
in bank embezzlement losses, it should be realized that there has been
a huge increase in the number of people working in banks, in the
amount of assets banks handle, and in over-all dollars-and-cents
activity in banks." In the last decade, the total assets of banks have
mounted from $194 to $303 billion dollars. The number of people
working in banks has increased from 439,000 to 685,000, and velocity
—the rate at which the money supply moves through the banking system—has increased by more than 20 per cent. Mr. Hottendorf said that
on a per capita basis embezzlements in banks were decreasing substantially from year to year.
Expansion in American business since World W a r II in terms of
total assets, operations, and personnel, is undoubtedly an important
factor in rising business-embezzlement losses as well as in banks,
but this is not the only theory. Decentralization of responsibility and
geographical dispersion of operations have been cited as making it
easier for dishonest employees, because when a business is far-flung
there is less home-office scrutiny, and only periodic rather than daily
checks on activities. Undoubtedly more important is an apparent
decline in American morality, as is amply shown by revelations of
payola, price-fixing, kickbacks, bribes, industrial espionage, misleading advertising, expense-account abuses, and income tax evasion. In
the latter area alone, over one and one-half billion dollars in penalties,
interest, and back taxes have been paid to the Internal Revenue
Service for the year 1957 alone, although in all fairness, it must be
admitted that a substantial portion of this amount relates to honest
differences of opinion.
In analyzing the maze of available facts, statistics, and opinions
on this subject of fraud, one truly alarming question keeps rising to
the surface: "How many undiscovered embezzlements are there in
business today, where are they, and what can be done about them?"
There is, of course, no answer to the first two parts of this question,
although one group of bankers estimates that undiscovered bank
losses total $10 to $25 million. Undiscovered embezzlements in business must, then, be enormous both in number and in amount. A s to
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what can be done about it, the answer is, in my opinion, to review
existing preventive measures to obtain assurance that the best possible job is being done. In many businesses there is much that can
be done in the areas of personnel selection and practices and improving the internal control.
First, let's take a look at the embezzler. One study of over 1,000
embezzlers revealed this composite picture of the average male embezzler. He is thirty-five, married, and has one or two children. He
lives in a respectable neighborhood, drives a medium-priced car, and is
often a church officer. He has been employed by his firm for three
years and he has been stealing for eight months. On the average his
total take exceeds his annual salary by twenty per cent.
The foregoing composite picture is, of course, a blending of
tremendous extremes, and does not cover women who, it has been
found, are just as dishonest as men if they are given the opportunity.
Very often though, and this is something we should never forget,
the embezzler is the last person anyone would believe capable of
committing fraud.
A n indication of the extremes blended into the composite picture
of the average male embezzler is found in the table, "Arrests by Age
Groups for Embezzlement and Fraud" in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. Of 32,600

arrests in 1960, the greatest number, 5,834, were in the 30-34 age group.
However, there also were 212 under age 15; 2,755 over age 50; and
substantial numbers in every age group in between.
Analysis of positions held by embezzlers indicates that no position is immune. In the study of over 1,000 embezzlers referred to
above, over 37 per cent held executive or managerial positions, with
most, over 47 per cent, coming from the ranks of sales and clerical
personnel.
The reasons for embezzlement are probably best left to a psychiatrist. They are as many and varied as their methods. It is not
uncommon to find the reason in the modern behavior that follows an
ancient pattern—gambling, extravagant living, and excessive drinking.
Medical expenses, support of parents or other relatives, expensive
hobbies, and just plain better living are often motives. One unusual
case concerns an embezzler who decided he needed an income of $4,500
to live decently, while his actual salary was only $2,500. He proceeded
to steal the difference. A s the years went by and his salary increased,
he reduced his thefts proportionately. When he finally began to make
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$4,500 a year legitimately, he stopped stealing. Then, as his salary
continued to rise, he reversed the process and began restoring the
difference between what he was actually making and the predetermined amount of $4,500. When the loss was discovered, he had repaid
all but $3,000 of a total of $25,000.
As long as we are dealing with people, the risk of losses from
thefts will be present. Many businessmen though, seem to accept this
as an inevitable business risk and fail to take safeguards to prevent it.
In the area of employment practices, the first rule should be to get
the right man for the right job. It is well to remember that an employee who, with or without reason, feels that he is underrated or
underpaid, can become a dissatisfied employee and a potential embezzler if given the opportunity.
Secondly, references should be thoroughly checked and former
employers consulted. For a variety of reasons, embezzlers are often
not prosecuted, and accordingly are free to go from job to job unhindered. Several cases, one quite recently, have come to my attention
where considerable embarrassment and financial loss could have been
precluded if the advice of references and former employers had been
sought. It is not a bad idea either, to look into the credit rating of
prospective employees.
Some items of personnel policy that should not be overlooked
include a good training program, a mandatory vacation policy, job
rotation, and periodic employee-evaluation reports. Not to be overlooked are reasons for consistent, and apparently diligent night and
week-end work, and the living standards and outside activities of
employees in positions of trust. W e should not forget that Minnie
Mangum, who embezzled $3 million over a 23-year period from a
Norfolk building and loan association was one who never took a
vacation, and even worked week ends and holidays to "get her records
in order."
A n excellent example of management's ignoring a danger signal
for some time is the case, reported in Fortune Magazine, of Roscoe
David Coon, Sr., who—between January 1950, and July 1955—embezzled $678,000 from the Joshua Monument National Bank of
Twenty-nine Palms, California. When Coon went to work for the
bank as vice president and cashier at a salary of $400 a month on
May 1, 1949, his worldly possessions consisted of an equity in a
small house, its furnishings, his personal effects, and two 1937-model
automobiles. When Coon was apprehended by Federal agents at the
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Del Mar track on July 25, 1955 (the same day the bank closed for
good), his financial status had changed considerably. He had purchased at least thirty-six thoroughbred race horses, which he had
raced at six California tracks, the Las Vegas track, and in Mexico.
One horse was bought by Coon in Kentucky for $53,500; another he
got in New Jersey for $60,000. H e had built at least seven houses
in the Twenty-nine Palms area, had engaged in turkey ranching and
gold mining, had made investments in a finance company, a lumber
company, and a night club and bar. During the same period Coon
had made a number of loans to people in Twenty-nine Palms, including customers who had been refused loans by the bank, fellow
employees, two bank directors—and the bank president.
As one insurance executive phrased it, the philosophy that the
world owes me a living is now being replaced by the world owes me
a high living.
Internal control is described by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as the plan of organization and all of the
coordinate methods and procedures adopted within a business to safeguard
its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial
policies.

W i t h respect to internal control, the principal responsibility of the
independent certified public accountant in connection with an examination of financial statements is to study and evaluate the existing
internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the extent of audit tests. Establishing and maintaining the
internal control are entirely within management's jurisdiction and,
therefore, the accompanying responsibility rests with management.
The possible existence of fraud is of paramount concern to every
practicing independent accountant. Nevertheless, where the objective
of the independent accountant is formulation of an opinion respecting
the fair presentation of the financial statements, the discovery of fraud
is no more than incidental. Whether errors are intentional or unintentional, their materiality is of major concern to the accountant.
Often, seemingly large errors escape our attention because, in view
of their immateriality with respect to the financial statements taken
as a whole, auditing procedures may not be designed to find them.
Also, published accounts of defalcations almost always give prominence to the cumulative amount concerned although the annual components may be inconsequential considering the size of the company.
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Very often your independent certified public accountant will, in
the course of his examination, detect areas in which the internal
control and accounting procedures might be improved. Management
should avail itself of his detached viewpoint, and request that he convey his thoughts to management either orally or in writing. Ideas,
suggestions, and recommendations concerning the internal-control accounting procedures and other accounting matters are a natural
result of the work of the independent accountant, who frequently is
more intimately familiar with procedures and routines on completion
of an examination than is the management.
While some studies have indicated that accident, rather than
auditing or good internal control, is responsible for discovering a
large percentage of embezzlements, it should not be overlooked that
auditing and good internal control, including internal auditing, do result in discovering a large number, and more importantly, in precluding many more. No prudent management will discount the value
of auditing or good internal control in this area.
The following few examples are typical of how embezzlements
are discovered. They are taken from a study of over one hundred
cases.
• The irregularity was discovered in the process of preparing the
year-end financial statements. The company's accountant
noted that the gross profit ratio was significantly distorted.
• The irregularity was discovered by an employee who observed
that certain sales were not being recorded on the cash register.
• Investigation of accounts receivable confirmation exceptions
during the course of an audit revealed the irregularities.
• In a small-loan company, while testing loan cards to the trial
balance of outstanding loans, the independent auditor noticed
that he had not been given cards for the oldest balances.
• Again in a small-loan company, the irregularity was discovered
during an unannounced visit by the supervisor of the loan
office.
• The defalcation was discovered by the company's office manager reviewing the monthly financial statements. He noticed
a large increase in the amount of accounts receivable and
decided to send out letters in an effort to increase collections.
Exceptions to amounts shown in the letters revealed the
defalcation.

220

• The records eventually became so numerous and the related
bookkeeping so complex that errors were made by the credit
manager which brought the shortage to the attention of one
of the firm's partners.
• Because of laxness on the part of the warehouse manager, the
company decided to dismiss him. In accordance with established company practice, a complete physical inventory was
taken at the time the manager was relieved. The inventory
shortage was discovered at this time.
• The petty cash shortage was discovered when two employees
took over the cashier's duties while he was ill. A count of
cash by the employees revealed the shortage in the fund.
Several lessons can be drawn from the foregoing cases, particularly where there is an indication of lack of proper controls or, on
the other hand, where the defalcation was discovered by an alert
employee who paid particular attention to detail.
The components of a good system of internal control differ from
company to company. The size of the company, the nature of the
operations, and the number and type of locations concerned must be
considered. Here is a list of some controls that will, in most cases,
apply regardless of the size of the company, in addition to the matter
of personnel selection and training already referred to:
• The organization should be clearly defined, and formalized by
use of an organization chart or its equivalent, setting forth
responsibilities of management personnel.
• Expenditures should be controlled through the use of a budget
system, preferably administered by a person independent
of the ones responsible for the expenditures. The company
should plan and forecast its objectives and there should be a
follow-up of deviations from budgeted amounts.
• Consistency of account classification and reporting should be
provided for by use of a chart of accounts.
• There should be a division of duties, to the extent practicable,
to preclude the concealment of irregularities singlehandedly,
and the existence of important unintentional errors in the
records.
• Useful periodic financial and statistical reports should be prepared for submission to the management on a timely basis.
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• There should be adequate follow-up to determine that prescribed procedures are being observed.
In addition to the foregoing procedures, which have general
applicability, there are many additional features of control concerning
the routine in the various areas of activity which must be tailored
to the nature and size of the business. These relate to the handling of
cash receipts, cash disbursements, sales, receivables, purchases, payrolls, inventories, property, securities and the like. Studies of actual
cases indicate the incidence of fraud and embezzlement is exceptionally high, both in number of cases and in dollar amount concerned, in the areas of cash receipts and disbursements. In one study
it was found that cash receipts accounted for over 50 per cent of the
number of cases, but only 16 per cent of the amount concerned. Cash
disbursements accounted for over 40 per cent of the number of cases,
and 80 per cent of the amount concerned. The conclusion can be
drawn that businesses are especially vulnerable, first, in cash-disbursement procedures and, secondly, in cash-receipts procedures. I would
like, therefore, to review some of the procedures deemed essential
to good internal control in these areas.
As to cash disbursements, first, the supply of blank checks should
be safeguarded, and preferably they should be numbered and all numbers accounted for. Use of a check protector is desirable, and protected paper should be used. One case that has come to my attention
may be of interest. On converting preparation of payrolls and payroll
checks from an old machine to a newer one, requiring a new form of
check, someone in the accounting department assumed responsibility
for disposing of the old supply of checks without mutilating them.
The checks fell into the hands of an unauthorized person who started
using them. His activities covered a wide area in several southern
states. It took six months for the F B I to catch up with him, and
caused the company considerable embarrassment.
It is preferable that the employee who prepares checks should not
have authority to sign the checks singly or to reconcile the bank
account. A l l checks should, of course, be prepared from approved
disbursement vouchers or check requisitions and the procedure should
assure payment of invoices within discount periods. If the checks are
signed mechanically the use of the machine and signature plate should
be properly controlled. A l l checks should be accompanied by approved disbursement vouchers or check requisitions when presented
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for signature and the supporting documents should be canceled to
prevent their being used again. Finally, the checks should be safeguarded against interception by unauthorized personnel prior to being
mailed, and should never be returned to the person initiating a request
for payment, for delivery to the payee by hand.
Bank accounts should be reconciled each month promptly on
receipt of the statements and canceled checks from the bank. The
procedure should provide for comparison of details of checks with
entries in the cash disbursements record, examination of signatures
and endorsements, accounting for the sequence of check numbers
and follow-up of old outstanding checks. Improperly endorsed checks
preferably should be returned to the bank with instructions to obtain
proper endorsements.
Disbursements from petty cash funds should be reviewed and
checked at the time they are vouchered for reimbursement, and the
supporting tickets and invoices should be canceled to prevent their
being used again. Petty cash tickets should be prepared in ink, in
such a manner as to preclude their being raised or otherwise altered
and, of course, should be approved. A l l disbursements from petty
cash funds should be processed for reimbursement, including loans
to employees, travel advances and the like. They should not be carried
in the fund for an indefinite period. It is preferable that petty cash
funds be on an imprest basis, and responsibility for their custody
should be definitely fixed. The amounts of such funds should be
reviewed periodically to determine that they are adequate, but not
excessive in the circumstances.
W i t h respect to cash receipts, mail receipts should be controlled
to prevent abstraction before entry in the cash-receipts record and
should be handled by as few persons as possible between the time of
receipt and the time of deposit. One unusual case relates to an incoming receipt of very substantial amount, almost $200,000. The
check was intercepted by an unauthorized person, who typed his own
name above the name of the payee, and the name of the city and
state below the name of the payee, so that the name of the legitimate
payee appeared to be part of an address. He then opened a bank
account and deposited the check. This irregularity was found because
bank officials noticed the unusual amount of the check, refused to
honor checks drawn on the account, and brought the matter to the
attention of the company. This case should, however, serve to emphasize the need for tight control in handling cash receipts. Incoming
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receipts should be deposited in the bank intact and not be commingled
with other cash or used for making disbursements or cashing checks.
A l l receipts should be deposited in the bank as promptly as possible.
Finally, persons who handle cash receipts should not have access to
other cash, such as cash on deposit, and funds not carried on the books
of the company, nor should they have custody of securities.
These are but a few of the procedures that should be considered
for the handling of cash receipts and disbursements. I would like to
repeat that they are not all-inclusive or universally applicable. In
many cases the nature of the business requires special routines, such
as in the case of retail routes, loan-office operations, and retail stores.
Closely related to internal control is the area of physical control
of assets, sometimes termed industrial security. Industrial pilferage
usually includes larceny, which results from unlawful entry, as well
as embezzlement, which refers generally to theft of property in an
employee's custody. Some factors to be considered in physically
safeguarding the assets of a company are plant location, plant layout,
the use of armed uniformed guards, alarms and closed circuit television, and outside perimeter security. These security measures are
important and should receive the careful attention of management.
It should be realized, however, that mechanical devices can be tampered with and are not infallible.
Undoubtedly time, although not a tangible asset of the company,
is one of the items most susceptible to theft. Coffee-break abuses,
late arrivals and early departures, water-cooler conversations, and
excessive use of powder-room privileges, are but a few examples. A
time clock is often helpful in controlling time, but this too is not
infallible, I have in mind a situation that existed in one New York
concern where some of the secretaries learned that they could punch
out for lunch, punch in from lunch, go shopping for the afternoon, and
return at five to punch out again.
In concluding, I should like to stress, as has perhaps been apparent from some of the examples presented, that there is the usual
as well as the unusual when we start looking for fraud and embezzlement. I firmly believe it is a matter that we all should have constantly
in mind, but with the realization that with respect to the type of
personality, motives, and method, we are looking for the unusual.
One story, which you may have heard, has now become a classic and
seems appropriate to demonstrate that the obvious should not be overlooked. It concerns the employee who approached the factory gate
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every night, pushing a wheelbarrow filled with sand. Each night the
guard filtered out all the sand but could find nothing amiss. A t the
end of the month the guard could take it no more. "Look," he told
the employee, "I know you're stealing something but for the life of
me I can't figure it out; before I go crazy, please tell me what it is.
I swear I won't turn you in." The employee winked and replied,
"Why, wheelbarrows, of course."
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